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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANTITRUST: NINTH CIRCUIT APPLIES LIBERAL
STANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR TREBLE DAMAGE
SUITS UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
H oopes v. Union Oil Co.' continues the judicial retreat from a
narrow delineation of the standing requirements for treble damage
suits under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2 The appellants owned a
filling station which was subject to a complex lease-leaseback arrange-
ment with Union Oil that previous litigation had determined to
constitute only a "requirements" contract. Prior to the instant liti-
gation, the station had been leased by the appellants to an operating
firm which had later surrendered possession. Appellants alleged that
all subsequent efforts to sell or lease the property had been frustrated
by Union's warning to prospective purchasers and lessees that the
premises were subject to a mortgage and to the requirements con-
tract. Asserting that Union's conduct was a part of a larger plan to
restrict commerce by establishing and maintaining a substantial
portion of the retailers in Alaska as exclusive outlets for Union
products,3 appellants sought treble damages for an alleged loss of
rental income and a diminution in the value of the property. The
district court granted summary judgment for Union "on the ground
that appellants 'lacked standing to sue [under section 4].' " Finding
that appellants clearly met the statutory requirements, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
' 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
a Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (requirements
contracts violated Clayton Act § 3).
See generally Bergstrom, The Private Litigant's Standing to Sue, 7 ANT'RUSmr BuLL.
3 (1962); Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Anti-
trust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691 (1963); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Require-
ments and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30
CEO. WASH. L. Ruv. 231 (1961); Whipple, Two Aspects of Plaintiffs' Treble Damage
Suits: Class Actions; Persons injured and Standing to Sue, 8 A.B.A. ANTITRUSr SEarON
27 (1956); Comment, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 64 COLUMr. L. REv. 570 (1964).
'374 F.2d at 482.
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Although section 4 of the Clayton Act creates a treble damages
remedy in "any person . . . injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"5 judicial inter-
pretation has wrung determinative limitation from virtually every
word of the section. Thus to sue for section 4 relief the claimant
must be the real party in interest.( Additionally, the "business" or
enterprise allegedly injured must be one in which the claimant was
actively engaged or fully prepared to engage at the time the injury
occurred.7 Moreover, the injury must not be indirect or remote,8
an exegesis apparently drawn from the statutory requirement that
the injury be "by reason of" unlawful monopolistic activity. Such
glosses upon the statutory language have engendered in substance a
"proximate cause" test in private antitrust litigation, though in form
and liberality of application the test has varied considerably within
the circuits. In- the Second Circuit, for example, allegedly illegal
conduct injuring an exclusive patent licensee has been held too
remote to produce a cognizable section 4 injury to the licensor whose
royalties correspondingly declined.9 Similarly, in the Third Circuit,
non-exhibiting movie theater lessors whose rental income was based
on a percentage of receipts have been denied section 4 recovery for
income lost when first-run films were unlawfully withheld from
538 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
6Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir.
1942) (members, not co-op, were real parties in interest); South Carolina Council of
Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259, 265 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (dictum), rev'd
on other grounds, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (co-op
members could assign their interest to association); Arlington Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (members, not club, were real parties in
interest); FED. R. Crv. P. 17 (a).
7 See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 .F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1966) (lack of
investment and prior experience resulting in finding of no "business"); Duff v. Kansas
City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1962) (former publisher with copyrighted name
had no "business'); Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.
1955) (unlicensed "promoter" not injured in "business or property").
8 See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 393-95
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) (materials supplier "remote" from
injury to manufacturer); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) (theater lessor only indirectly injured by acts against
lessee); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La.), aff'd per
curiam, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963) (employees); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Mass.), affd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957) (insurance agent); ef. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 Fed. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholders).
'Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1955).
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their operating lessees. 10 However, both the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have allowed recovery in comparable situations."
The Supreme Court has observed that in light of congressional
policy favoring the private antitrust litigant, standing requirements
beyond those specifically set forth in the statute are inappropriate. 12
Such a broad exposition of the statute, however, offers no guidelines
to the lower courts but merely intimates that a latitudinous approach
to the section 4 standing question should be taken. The Ninth
Circuit has undertaken a more specific exposition of the statutory
proximity criterion. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.3
held that standing to sue under section 4 was contingent upon a
litigant's demonstration that "he is within that area of the economy
which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a
particular industry."'14 Later cases have clarified this language and
have expanded the "target area" to include all business operations
within the area which could reasonably be foreseen to be affected
by the violator's conspiracy.15 Suggested -as a realistic formulation
of a "proximate cause" standard for section 4 standing problems,' 6
this Palsgrafian test has been applied, implicitly or explicitly, in most
circuits which have considered cases where the "remoteness" of the
injury was at issue.'7
1* Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
890 (1956); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (ED. Pa. 1953),
aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); accord, Skourkas Theaters
Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401, 407 (SnD.N.Y. 1961).
1 Sandidge v. Rogers, 256 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1958) (gravel pit lessor); Congress Bldg.
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (movie theater lessor); Steiner v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956) (movie theater lessor).
2 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); see Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (per curiam);
cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311
(1965); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948).
I' 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951).1
'Id. at 54-55.
is See South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (milk producers organization was
within the "target area" of competing integrated processor-retailer), 53 VA. L. REv.
170 (1967); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964) (motion picture producer within the "target
area" of theater chain); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362-64 (9th
Cir. 1955) (competing manufacturer).
* Pollack, supra note 2, at 706-07.
2 T See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d
414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Harmon v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
339 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1964); Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal
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In Hoopes, Union Oil argued that Hoopes was a lessor, and as
such could not recover damages since, as to the lessor, antitrust viola-
tions against the lessee are "indirect" and "remote." Alternatively,
the defendant asserted that recovery for any injury caused by this
contractual relationship was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.18 The Ninth Circuit rejected the first argument, noting
that even were the antitrust claim as limited as Union contended,
restrictive interpretations of section 4, such as those on which Union
relied,19 are of questionable validity when measured against the
broad construction which the Supreme Court appears to have given
the section.20 In fact, the Hoopes' claim was not a narrow one, for
the court found that it was grounded, not on the lessor-lessee rela-
tionship between the parties, but on Union's "entire course of con-
duct," which allegedly was aimed at restricting to its own use petrole-
um outlets in the Alaska area. Therefore, the claim was not barred by
the statute of limitations since this course of conduct had continued
up to, and even after, the time the complaint was filed. Assuming
the truth of the allegations for purposes of the appeal from the sum-
mary judgment, the court likewise determined that appellants were
within the area which Union could reasonably have foreseen would
be affected by its actions, especially since some of Uniori's conduct
was aimed directly at the appellants and their property. Thus, con-
cluded the court, the Hoopes were clearly within the "target area,"
and their injury could therefore be found compensable. Similarly,
Co., 298 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1961); Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587
(7th Cir. 1957); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, $62-63 (9th Cir.
1955); Schulman v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965); cf.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). But see Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
808 F.2d 383, 393-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Centanni v. T.
Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.), af'd per curiam, 323 F.2d 363 (5th
Cir. 1963).
21 Clayton Act § 4B, added by 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
19 Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 890 (1956); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (El). Pa. 1953),
aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Westmoreland Asbestos
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), af'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1940).
2" See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961) (per curiam); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957);
cf. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 881 U.S. 311 (1965), 64 MiCH. L. REv. 1156 (1966);
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
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the court decided that the appellants' injuries were "direct," and not
''consequential,' ''secondary," or "remote."
The court thus concluded that the connection between the prop-
erty owners' injury and Union's alleged illegal conduct "satisfies all
of the formulations of the statute's requirements suggested by any
decision of which we are aware .... "21 Nonetheless the tenor of
the opinion decidedly reflects the growing judicial preference for a
liberal interpretation of section 4, commensurate with the statutory
language. Summarily noting that "imposition of . . . damages
[would serve] the statute's purposes," 22 the court held that the statute
protects all victims sufficiently proximate to the illegal activity.2
As Hoopes illustrates, however, even application of all the judicially
contrived tests of section 4 proximity does not conclusively define the
scope of culpably produced injury. Obviously some limits need be
placed on the liability of the antitrust law violator, lest the number of
suits and size of the aggregate recovery for any one violation grow
vastly disproportionate to the economic injury inflicted. 24 Perhaps
the best delimiting concept yet devised is the foreseeability standard
as incorporated in the present "target area" test. Such a standard
provides a rational guideline and sufficient flexibility to meet varying
factual situations. Wider adoption of the "target area" test would
clarify and simplify many standing problems in a manner consistent
with the Supreme Court's current approach to private antitrust
actions.
21374 F.2d at 485.
22 Ibid.
"1 See id. at 486, quoting from Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
"'See generally Pollock, supra note 2, at 697-99; Comment, Standing to Sue for
Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 585-88
(1964).
[Vol. 1967: 686
